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Abstract
Deception is a central component of the personality 'Dark Triad' (Machiavellianism, Psy-
chopathy and Narcissism). However, whether individuals exhibiting high scores on Dark
Triad measures have a heightened deceptive ability has received little experimental atten-
tion. The present study tested whether the ability to lie effectively, and to detect lies told by
others, was related to Dark Triad, Lie Acceptability, or Self-Deceptive measures of person-
ality using an interactive group-based deception task. At a group level, lie detection accura-
cy was correlated with the ability to deceive others—replicating previous work. No evidence
was found to suggest that Dark Triad traits confer any advantage either to deceive others,
or to detect deception in others. Participants who considered lying to be more acceptable
were more skilled at lying, while self-deceptive individuals were generally less credible and
less confident when lying. Results are interpreted within a framework in which repeated
practice results in enhanced deceptive ability.
Introduction
Many studies have shown humans to be relatively poor lie detectors, performing little better
than chance at discriminating truthful from deceptive statements [1,2]. Despite the poor per-
formance of the average individual, some authors claim substantial individual differences, such
that some people are capable of detecting deception at levels far above chance (e.g. the ‘Wizards
Project’ of O'Sullivan & Ekman, [3]; c.f. Bond & DePaulo, [2]). This claim has prompted a se-
ries of studies aiming to elucidate the factors which may determine deception detection ability.
The results of these studies are fairly conclusive; of the characteristics studied (age, occupation,
education or gender), none seem to consistently co-vary with the ability to detect lies (see
meta-analyses [4,2]).
Recent research from our own lab suggests that lie detection ability may be associated with
lie production ability—a deception-general ability. Using an interactive paradigm (theDecep-
tive Interaction Task ‘DeceIT’ [5]), we found that participants able to successfully deceive oth-
ers were also able to successfully detect others’ attempts to deceive. However, this result
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requires replication, as it stands in contrast to two earlier studies which, using non-interactive
tasks, found no relationship between lie production and detection [6,7].
Importantly, relatively few studies have examined predictors of the ability to produce suc-
cessful lies. This is surprising as the success or failure of any deceptive interaction may be more
attributable to the performance of the liar than that of the lie detector [8]. A meta-analysis by
Bond and DePaulo [2] suggested that individuals vary more in terms of the detectability of
their lies rather than in their ability to detect deception, and vary maximally in terms of their
general credibility (or Demeanour Bias; [9]).
Despite limited experimental attention, it is often assumed that there exists an association
between the ‘Dark Triad’ and deceptive ability, with those scoring higher on Dark Triad mea-
sures demonstrating increased ability to deceive others. The Dark Triad is a cluster of three
higher-order personality constructs (Machiavellianism, Psychopathy and Narcissism), which
are moderately inter-correlated, but which are nevertheless considered to be distinct [10]. The
Dark Triad is stable over time, observed across various regions of the world [11], and is moder-
ately heritable (with heritability estimates between .31 and .72; [12]).
The Dark Triad has been associated with numerous antisocial tendencies related to deceit
(e.g. [13,14,15]). Machiavellians prioritise the attainment of money and power [16], and have
been described as preferentially adopting deceitful and duplicitous behaviour in order to gain
dominance [17]. This preference for deceptive strategies is supported by diary studies in which
Machiavellians report telling more lies than those low in Machiavellianism [18]. However, ex-
perimental studies of the relationship between deceptive ability and Machiavellianism have
produced mixed results. An early study by Exline, Thibaut, Hickey, and Gumpert [19] found
that high Machiavellians were able to lie more convincingly than low Machiavellians. Five fur-
ther studies, however, failed to show the same pattern of results [20]. DePaulo and Rosenthal
[6] used a video-based deception task and found that high Machiavellian individuals were less
likely to be caught lying than low Machiavellian individuals, but this result was not replicated
by Manstead, Wagner and MacDonald [7]. In the only study also to look at lie detection ability,
Geis and Moon [21] found that high Machiavellians were better able to lie than low Machiavel-
lians, and were rated as more credible, but did not show enhanced lie detection abilities. A
meta-analysis of this mixed literature found no evidence for enhanced deceptive skill in high-
Machiavellian individuals [22].
The second Dark Triad trait, psychopathy, has been argued to be the prototypical syn-
drome for pathological lying, deception, and manipulation [23,24,25,26], with psychopaths
deriving particular satisfaction from deceit [25,27]. There have not been many empirical stud-
ies of the association between deception production abilities and psychopathy, but the exist-
ing literature suggests that although psychopaths report a higher ability to deceive others
than non-psychopaths, this may not be an accurate reflection of reality [28,29]. In addition,
no relationship was found between psychopathy and the ability to detect deception [25,30] al-
though in the latter study the correlation between deception detection and psychopathic traits
approached significance.
Narcissism is not associated with deception as commonly as the rest of the Dark Triad
traits. Narcissists are competitive, seek power and glory, and exhibit a grandiose sense of self.
Their grandiose sense of self is maintained in the face of negative/realistic feedback through
self-deception [31,32,10,33,34]. The ability to successfully self-deceive has been argued to
bring about a greater ability to deceive others (see Trivers, [35,36]). Indeed, Trivers [36] has
argued that the reason why humans have evolved the capacity to self-deceive is precisely be-
cause it aids in the deception of others; if the liar is unaware that they are lying it is less likely
that they will exhibit any deceptive ‘cues’. However, whether narcissists do indeed have greater
deceptive ability than non-narcissists has not been investigated empirically.
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This study aims to examine the relationship between deceptive ability (both production and
detection) and the Dark Triad, including associated measures of lie acceptability and self-
deception. The overall aim is to determine whether any of these measures can predict perfor-
mance when producing or detecting deceptive statements. The use of the DeceIT procedure al-
lows these individual difference variables to be tested against success in the detection and the
production of deceptive statements, and also against measures of general credibility and credu-
lity (or truth bias) through the use of signal detection theory [37] applied to performance in
both the Sender and Receiver roles as originally presented in [5] and detailed in [38].
Method
Participants
75 healthy adult participants (28 male, 47 female, Mean age = 27.25 years, SD = 7.59) took part
in a computer-administered competitive interactive group deception task (DeceIT—Wright
et al., 2012 [5]). Participants were fluent English speakers and all provided written informed
consent to participate. The procedure received ethical approval from the Birkbeck Psychologi-
cal Research Ethics Committee.
Materials and apparatus
Prior to the task, participants completed questionnaires assessing Machiavellianism, sub-clini-
cal Narcissism and sub-clinical Psychopathy. These were: the MACH-IV [20], the Narcissistic
Personality Inventory Short-Form (NPI-16) [39] and the Sub-Clinical Self-Report Psychopathy
Questionnaire Short-Form (SRP-SF) [40]. Participants also completed the Self-Deception Scale
of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding [41] as used by Lynch & Trivers [42] to
measure self-deception, and the Lie Acceptability Scale [43] which measures the extent to
which an individual considers deceit to be an acceptable strategy to achieve personal goals.
As per the original DeceIT task detailed in [5] a False-Opinion Paradigm was employed
[44,45]. Ground truth was initially obtained by presenting a “Social Opinion Questionnaire”
which comprised a series of ‘For or Against’ questions relating to topical issues that had recent-
ly featured in mainstream media such as Censorship of the Media and Nuclear Power.
In a development from its earlier implementation, the DeceIT paradigm was administered
on 9-inch tablet PCs. The underlying procedure (see below) was otherwise identical to the orig-
inal DeceIT task [5]. Experimental instructions and stimulus material were presented on the
tablet PCs, which were positioned for ease of viewing and were not visible to other players. Par-
ticipant responses in each trial were prompted on screen and collected via
touchscreen responses.
Procedure
Participants were recruited in groups of five to a “Communication Skills Experiment”. Partici-
pants were seated in a circle of five chairs with integral writing platforms. The participants
were identified by numbers from one to five and informed that they would be referred to by
number only to maintain confidentiality.
The deceptive interactive task (DeceIT) required participants to take turns making true or
false statements on the opinion topics previously surveyed using the Social Opinion Question-
naire. Upon a cue presented on the tablet screen, the participant randomly allocated to the
Sender role for the current trial was informed of the topic (e.g. Animal Testing) and the veraci-
ty of the statement required (lie or truth). All those allocated to the Receiver role (i.e. those re-
quired to judge the veracity of the statement) were told to attend to a specified participant by
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number. The statements were made verbally and participants were instructed to speak as soon
as they were ready for between 20 and 30 seconds. At the end of the statement, Senders were
asked to rate the perceived credibility of the statement they had just made. The four partici-
pants not randomly allocated to the Sender role on each trial (i.e. those in the Receiver role)
were instructed to judge whether the Sender was making a true or false statement.
The experimental trials continued with quasi-random allocation of topics and of the
Sender role until each participant had made both truthful and deceptive statements on each
of the 8 opinion topics, resulting in 80 live trials per participant group. High-value incentives
(£50 monetary prizes) were offered to the best performers in the Sender and Receiver roles.
In order to accurately measure credibility, it was made clear to participants that to be as suc-
cessful as possible in the Sender role they should be as credible as possible on every trial—
and that trying to appear as if they were lying when telling the truth would be a counter-
productive strategy.
Prior to the DeceIT task all participants observed the experimenter perform two demonstra-
tion trials to the group as a whole (reading out verbatim responses from previous iterations of
the task), and ran through two practice trials (one of which required them to lie, and one to tell
the truth) without speaking aloud. At the end of the task, participants rated their Guilt, Anxiety
and Cognitive Load (described as mental effort in the rubric) in both experimental conditions
on 7 point Likert scales with end points labelled ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’.
Data collection and analysis strategy
Performance in the Receiver and Sender roles was analysed using a Signal Detection Theory
framework (SDT) [37] as previously described in Wright et al. [5]. Performance in both Receiv-
er and Sender roles is indexed using lie-truth differential performance (dʹ) measured indepen-
dently of bias (C). Separate SDT measures were calculated for the Receiver/Sender roles: the
Receiver’s capacity to discriminate lies from truths is indexed by dʹReceiver; the corresponding
measure of bias, CReceiver, corresponds to Truth Bias (with negative values indicating the ten-
dency to judge statements as truthful regardless of veracity, while a positive value indicates a
bias to classify messages as lies). The discriminability of the Sender’s truths and lies is indexed
by dʹSender. The corresponding measure of bias, CSender, indicates the perceived overall credibili-
ty of a Sender, regardless of their veracity, and is often termed ‘Demeanour Bias’ within the de-
ception literature—negative scores indicating higher credibility and positive scores indicating
lower credibility. With these measures, better lie detection is indicated by higher dʹReceiver val-
ues, and increasingly successful deception (relative to success when telling the truth) is indicat-
ed by more negative values of dʹSender.
Results
Dark Triad measures
Broad variability in all Dark Triad measures was observed, with 31 individuals (41% of sample)
being identified as “high-Machiavellians”. Recommended cut-off scores for Narcissism and
Psychopathy are not available given the sub-clinical usage of the instruments employed. In line
with previous research [10] moderate correlations were found between all Dark Triad compo-
nents ranging from .247 to .349 (all p<.05, see Table 1 below). In addition, a significant positive
correlation was observed between Machiavellianism and Lie-Acceptability (.384, p = .001) and,
between Narcissism and Self-Deception (.259, p = .025).
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DeceIT measures
Broad individual differences were observed in all four of the performance measures (M dʹReceiver
= 0.078, SD = 0.496; M CReceiver = 0.065, SD = 0.193; M dʹSender = 0.091, SD = 0.502; M Csender =
-0.086, SD = 0.191). As previously observed [5] detectability in the Sender role (dʹSender) and the
ability to discriminate in the Receiver role (dʹReceiver) were significantly correlated (r = −0.471, p
<.001, Fig 1). As the ability to discriminate truthful from deceptive messages increased, the
ability to produce deceptive messages that were less likely to be judged as deceptive in compari-
son to truthful messages, increased. This replicates the main finding presented in [5].
Participants reported greater Guilt, Anxiety and Cognitive Load when lying than when tell-
ing truth (Guilt t(74) = 8.029, p<.001, Anxiety t(74) = 7.257, p<.001, Cognitive Load t(74) =
7.588, p<.001), and exhibited typical chronometric cues to deception (e.g. [46,47,5]). Response
Table 1. Table of correlations betweenMachiavellianism, Narcissism, Psychopathy, Composite Dark Triad, Lie Acceptability, Self-Deception and
the four SDT-derived performancemeasures in the DeceIT task.
Machiavellianism Narcissism Psychopathy Lie Acceptability Self-Deception
Machiavellianism x .260, p = .024* .349, p = .002* .384, p = .001* .118, p = .314
Narcissism x .247, p = .033* -.013, p = .909 .259, p = .025*
Psychopathy x .101, p = .386 .157, p = .179
Lie Acceptability x -.093, p = .429
Self-Deception x
d’Receiver -.026, p = .828 -.145, p = .216 -.059, p = .617 -.022, p = .854 -.196, p = .092
CReceiver .094, p = .422 .113, p = .333 .082, p = .484 .038, p = .747 -.043, p = .713
d’Sender -.103, p = .379 .054, p = .646 -.063, p = .593 -.245, p = .034* .131, p = .261
CSender -.098, p = .404 .179, p = .123 .045, p = .702 -.093, p = .426 .256, p = .027*
(* indicates signiﬁcant at p < 0.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127315.t001
Fig 1. Correlation between Sender and Receiver performance using SDTmeasures for Receiver Accuracy (d ʹ Receiver) and Sender Detectability
(d ʹ Sender): r = − 0.471, p <.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127315.g001
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latency was significantly shorter when participants told the truth (M = 4.128 s SD = 1.336)
than when they lied (M = 5.510 s SD = 2.371, t(74) = -6.409, p<.001), while response duration
was significantly longer for truthful statements (M = 21.778 s, SD = 6.178) than for deceptive
statements (M = 16.736 s, SD = 3.150, t(74) = 6.818, p<.001). Decreasing detectability in the
Sender role (dʹSender) was associated with a reduced response latency difference between truth-
ful and deceptive statements (r = 0.237, p = .040), as observed in Wright et al. [5].
To permit comparison with previous studies, performance was also analysed using percent-
age accuracy. Overall accuracy in the Receiver role was found to be 51.49% (SD = 9.39), not sig-
nificantly different from chance (t(74) = 1.373, p = .174). To compare truth-bias in the Receiver
role with previously reported findings we calculated the number of statements of all types clas-
sified by Receivers as truthful and found it to be 52.47% (SD = 7.35%) a figure significantly
higher than chance (t(74) = 2.912, p = .005).
Associations between individual differences and DeceIT performance
measures
No association was observed between any of the Dark Triad measures (Machiavellianism, Nar-
cissism or Psychopathy; see Table 1), or a combined Dark Triad score (r = .133, p = .254), and
performance in either the Sender or Receiver roles in the DeceIT task. However, a significant
correlation was observed between Lie Acceptability Scale scores and discriminability in the
Sender role (dʹSender, r = -.245, p = .034); those who consider deception more acceptable tended
to make deceptive statements that weremore difficult to discriminate from the truth by Receiv-
ers, while a significant correlation was found between Self-Deception and credibility in the
Sender role (CSender, r = .256, p = .027) indicating that individuals higher in the trait of self-de-
ception appeared generally less credible in the task, i.e. overall their lies and truths were less
likely to be believed. Step-wise multiple regressions using Dark Triad scores as predictor vari-
ables, and Sender and Receiver performance in the DeceIT task as dependant variables were
conducted, but failed to reveal any higher-order relationships between Dark Triad scores and
deceptive ability.
Participants’ self-reported confidence ratings were significantly lower for the deceptive con-
dition (M = 0.468, SD = 0.180) than for the truthful condition (M = 0.603, SD = 0.207, t(74) =
-4.762, p<.001). The difference between confidence ratings for deceptive and truthful condi-
tions (where lower scores indicate lower relative confidence in the lie condition) was found to
correlate negatively with CSender (r = -.253, p = .029) and positively with self-deception (r =
-.312, p = .006). Given that CSender (overall credibility) is derived such that lower scores indicate
higher credibility, the negative relationship with confidence indicates that participants with
higher overall credibility in the DeceIT task were more confident. The positive relationship be-
tween self-deception and relative confidence when lying indicates that increasing self-decep-
tion is associated with less confidence when lying in comparison to when telling the truth. This
relationship was driven by confidence when lying: individuals high in self-deception (by medi-
an split) were significantly less confident in the deceptive condition (M = 0.416, SD = 0.174)
than those low in self-deception (M = 0.520, SD = 0.173, t(73) = -2.595, p = .011), whereas no
significant difference was observed for their confidence when telling the truth.
Discussion
The main finding of this study is that Dark Triad traits (Machiavellianism, Psychopathy or
Narcissism) were not associated with the ability to either produce lies which others found diffi-
cult to discriminate from truth, or to discriminate truth from lies when judging others. Howev-
er, Lie Acceptability was associated with the ability to produce successful lies. In addition, the
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extent to which one engages in self-deception was found to correlate with poorer overall per-
formance in the Sender role of the DeceIT task as measured by credibility (CSender).
From the characterisation of the ‘Dark Triad’ personality traits we expected to find that in-
dividuals scoring highly on such personality traits would show a greater deceptive ability. In
contrast however, none of the individual Dark Triad measures were associated with either the
ability to produce or to detect deception. These results are consistent with the extant research
on Dark Triad traits and deceptive ability which have predominantly used non-interactive par-
adigms: although some previous research has claimed a link between Machiavellianism and de-
ceptive ability (e.g. [19,6]), a meta-analysis of existing research found no support for an
increased ability to lie in high Machiavellian individuals [22]; similarly the little empirical re-
search conducted on the ability of psychopathic individuals to deceive has identified no partic-
ular deception-related ability [25,30]. As far as we are aware no previous study has looked at
the deceptive ability of individuals with narcissistic traits.
A potential explanation for the inconsistent findings with regard to an association between
Machiavellianism and the ability to produce successful lies may be found in the significant cor-
relation between the degree to which participants rated lying as acceptable and their ability to
produce successful lies. Machiavellianism and Lie Acceptability were significantly correlated
(an acceptance of deception as a means of achieving one’s goals is one of the primary features
of the Machiavellian trait). This correlation was only of moderate strength however (r = .384)
and so sampling bias in terms of Lie Acceptability within a high Machiavellian sample may de-
termine the extent to which the high Machiavellian sample outperform a low Machiavellian
sample via the mediating influence of Lie Acceptability. More generally, the association be-
tween Lie Acceptability and success in producing lies merits further investigation. At least two
mechanisms may explain why those for whom lying is more acceptable are better able to lie.
First, the endorsement of lying as an interpersonal strategy may permit an individual to lie
more, and thus garner greater opportunities to practice deceiving others. Second, those who
consider lying more acceptable might experience less of the guilt and anxiety brought about by
lying [48] and therefore exhibit fewer associated cues. The second hypothesis received little
support from the current data however, where the relationships between lie acceptability mea-
sures and self-reported guilt and anxiety when lying were not significant (analysed using differ-
ential scores, lie minus truth, or lie alone, max r = 0.111, p = .342).
An experiential account is also likely to explain the association between CSender and the con-
fidence with which people lie (relative to their confidence when telling the truth). CSender index-
es an individual’s general credibility (or Demeanour Bias)—irrespective of whether they are
telling the truth or lying. Individuals with higher credibility reported higher relative confidence
when lying than those with lower credibility. Sender demeanour has been shown to have a
strong influence on the outcome of deceptive encounters [49], and the relationship between
credibility and confidence may be an indication that individuals have learned their level of
credibility over many deceptive encounters.
Self-deception was not associated with an increased ability to lie effectively in these data: no
relationship was observed between the ability to deceive as indexed by dʹSender—and the rela-
tionship between self-deception and general credibility was significantly negative. Thus, indi-
viduals high in self-deception were seen as generally less credible than those low in self-
deception. This finding is in contrast to the hypothesis that self-deception contributes to decep-
tive success (e.g. [36,50], and with a recent investigation in a classroom setting [51]; however
note that in this study participants were not actually lying, others were deceived by the partici-
pant’s erroneous, but not deceptive, self-perception). Self-deception was hypothesized to be of
benefit when lying in two ways. First, the self-deceptive individual no longer emits consciously-
mediated cues to deception (such as signs of nervousness, guilt, or cognitive load) as they are
Good Liars Are Neither ‘Dark’ Nor Self-Deceptive
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0127315 June 17, 2015 7 / 11
not aware that they are lying. Second, those who are self-deceptive are able to project an image
of themselves as being more confident than they may otherwise seem (due to the ability to de-
ceive themselves about their strengths and weaknesses), and gain the resultant social advan-
tages (including being viewed as credible) that self-deception brings. The current data does not
provide any support to the first hypothesis; the ability to deceive as measured by dʹSender was
not associated with self-deception, and the negative relationship between CSender and self-de-
ception goes against the second hypothesis, as individuals higher in self-deception were gener-
ally perceived as being less credible. Interestingly, this effect may be mediated by confidence. In
contrast to the hypothesized relationship between self-deception and confidence when lying,
those high in self-deception had lower relative confidence that their lies would be believed (r =
-.312, p = 0.006).
Of note is the replication of the association between skill in producing successful lies and in
detecting the lies of others. This result was first found using the DeceIT paradigm [5], but re-
quired replication as two previous studies [6,7] had found lie production and detection skill to
be unrelated (although it should be noted that the correlation between lie production and de-
tection approached significance in the latter study). A possible reason for the discrepancy be-
tween the results obtained using the DeceIT procedure and the earlier studies is that the
DeceIT procedure involved social interaction whereas the earlier studies did not. It is therefore
plausible that whatever skill contributes to the correlation between detection and production of
deception in the DeceIT paradigm is of maximum efficacy when social interaction is possible.
In both studies using the DeceIT paradigm a significant correlation was observed between
discriminability when lying and an individual’s increase in response time when lying. These
data therefore suggest that when detecting deception, Receivers (lie detectors) use response la-
tency as a cue to deception, and that good liars can control the extent to which they exhibit this
cue. The use of response latency as a cue to deceit by those judging deception is valid; response
latencies for deceptive statements were significantly longer than those for true statements.
Whether the use / control of response latency by Receivers / Senders is deliberate or implicit is
an interesting avenue for future investigation.
As in any experimental study of deception one must question the validity of the deceptive
behaviour elicited by the experimental context. It could be argued that in the DeceIT paradigm
the experimenter sanctions lies, and therefore the guilt associated with deception is reduced.
We have discussed this issue, and the wider issue of laboratory-based deception research previ-
ously [5], and interested readers are directed to this paper. We briefly note that previous work
suggests that there is very little difference in the detectability of sanctioned and unsanctioned
lies (see meta-analysis by Sporer & Schwandt, [52]), and that participants were attempting to
deceive other participants in a competitive scenario, rather than attempting to deceive the ex-
perimenter who had sanctioned the lie. While stakes were not of the magnitude involved in
real-life criminal investigations, the availability of significant financial prizes and the competi-
tive element of the task were designed to increase the likelihood that participants were engaged
in the task.
In summary, despite the way in which its component traits are conceptualised, the Dark
Triad appears unrelated to deceptive ability, either in the role of lie detector or liar. Although
the current experimental sample (n = 75) is modest in comparison with individual differences
questionnaire based research samples, sufficient variability was observed in Dark Triad traits to
suggest any meaningful relationship with deceptive performance might have emerged. Indeed,
power analysis suggests even the strongest relationship between Dark Triad measures and de-
ceptive ability would require a sample of 191 participants in order to reach significance and
would suggest poorer deception detection associated with Dark Triad traits rather than any
deceptive skill.
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In contrast, lie acceptability, the extent to which one endorses deceit and manipulative be-
haviour, relates positively to deceptive success. Furthermore, contrary to the hypothesis that
self-deception is evolutionarily selected to promote the effective deception of others, these re-
sults suggest that high self-deceivers are less credible overall, and less confident when lying,
than those low in self-deception. This study replicated the key findings of Wright et al. [5]: the
ability to lie well correlates with an ability better to detect deception in others; and the control
of response latency difference when lying may be key to producing successful lies, and to de-
tecting those lies in others.
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